After subjecting the reader to an intellectual ambush by citing the Deoband vs Ahl-i-Hadith dispute in the complex Imrana case in India in 2005 (relating to whether a marriage was void or not, in a very specific situation), Professor Ebrahim Moosa goes on to debate the tension between the rulings of an established ulema “orthodoxy” and contemporary moral norms – making a powerful case for re-establishing “conceptions of the shari‘a as a set of ethical and moral norms rather than a set of rigid rules or laws.”
| Indeed, this challenge is shared across cultures: a ‘language of universality’ in tension with the repeated ‘translation’ of incommensurable levels of living and meaning’. In this in-between space, which I have called the dihliz elsewhere, the gap between universality and translation comes with risks. It requires that we foster a certain future and goal, or what Bernard Williams calls a ‘teleologically significant world’. If such a world is out of reach, then it can bring about an epistemology of despair that the truth is out of reach. Humans have sought to avoid this despair by placing faith in an omnipresent, all-knowing God who embodies the truth (tawhid). But in a tawhid- centred truth world, the goal should not be certainties of right versus wrong. Ethics is the realm of the undecided, where we find ourselves between the contending norms and multiple realities of life. Ethical space is also an aesthetic space, where beauty manifests itself in life and all its forms, including the violent and the tragic. So the obligation is to cultivate an ethos, a space or a dwelling for habitation. Equality, compassion, justice, freedom and other moral virtues take place within this space. Action is always framed by ethos, which prevents action from becoming oppressive. When action and ethos combine, new possibilities of the ethical emerge. Tradition, truth-seeking and optimism are critical parts of ensuring that the truth is discoverable. But for this to be possible, an ethos must be situated in a space in between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ – the dihliz. In Islam, truth-seeking in ethics begins with discernment. The term fiqh, often used to describe the body of knowledge consisting of the applied rules of the shari‘a, actually signifies knowledge and discernment. Over time, this tradition of discernment ceased to be a process of active thinking about ethical knowledge and became an exercise in learning the opinions of one’s predecessors. The need to follow tradition under the imprimatur of obeying canonical authority (taqlid) became a priority. Following tradition became a sign of fealty to a law school. The dynamic act of discerning (fiqh) the discourse of revelation – the shari‘a – and its intentions faded. In its place rose an impressive tradition of scholarship that canonised the authority of the ulama but was less creative. Fiqh became displaced from its ethical centre. |
For the essay, including citations, see Professor Moosa’s website click here.